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In an effort to stop the old Soviet space program from
plunging into a cataclysmic spiral of illicit foreign sales
of its ballistic missile technology, and also to prevent the
Russian space infrastructure from imploding, the United
States entered into a series of bilateral and multi-national
agreements to work with, and to support the inheritor of the
Soviet space legacy, the Russian Space Agency. This thesis
discusses how a partnership with the Russian Federation and
Russian Space Agency within the International Space Station
can both act as an incentive for the Russians to prevent
illicit proliferation of its space and ballistic missile
technology and offer unique, viable operational, technical,
and scientific advantages for the International Space
Station and the United States. Alternative options to, and







A. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION 1
1. India, Iran, and Russian Ballistic Missile
Technology 1
2 . Valid Arguments 4
B. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION 5
1. Postponement of the Functional Cargo Block.. 5
2 . The Chabrow Report 8
3 . Valid Arguments 9
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING OR "IS THE
GLASS HALF FULL OR HALF EMPTY?" 11
1 . Common Interests 11
2 . Common Concerns 12
D. COMPELLING REASONS 14
1 . Shoring up the Remains 14
2 . Strategic Perspective 15
3 . Commercial Perspective 16
E. A CLEAR REALITY 17
F. CONCLUSION 18
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM 21
A. THE GERMAN V-2 ROCKET PROGRAM 21
1. The Fight for German Expertise and
Personnel 21
2. Soviet Motivation for Ballistic Missile
Technology 24
B. SPUTNIK HO! 26
C
.
TECHNICAL CULTURE AND ETHOS 28
1. Brute Force and Quantity over Quality 28
2
.
Staying with the Tried and True 29
3 Early Soviet Space Budget 32
D CONCLUSION 33
III . THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY 37
A. ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY 37
1 The Demise of the Soviet Union 37
2 Two Steps Backwards 38
3. One Step Forward 39
B. POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 4
1. A Legislative, Vice Military, Mandate 40
2. Western-Supported Technology Transfer 41
3. RSA and the Impact of Privatization 43
4. Russian Federation Financial Delinquency.... 44
5 Causes for Optimism 45
C. CONCLUSION 48
vu
IV. RUSSIAN FEDERATION SPACE CAPABILITIES 51
A. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RUSSIAN SPACE PROGRAM 51
1
.
A Typical Space Architecture 51




BAIKONUR LAUNCH FACILITY 56
1 Location and Early History 56
2 Launch History and Capabilities 57
3. Impact of the Dissolution of the
Soviet Union 61
4 . Causes for Optimism 62
C PROTON LAUNCH VEHICLE 64
1 . Launch History and Capabilities 64
2 . Proton s Strengths 68
D. IN-SITU BIOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE AND INSIGHTS 69
1 . Extended Space Presence 69
2 . Microgravity Experience 70
E CURRENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 72
1. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, et al 72
2 . Engine Technology 73
F. COOPERATION AND OPPORTUNITY 7 5
1. NASA Steps In 7 5
G . CONCLUSION 7 6
1. Russian Strengths of Baikonur and the
Proton 7 6
2 . Unlimited Potential 7 8
V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
PROLIFERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION ... 81
A. BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION AND
THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY 81
1. Russia and the Missile Technology Control
Regime 81
2. The ISS as Proliferation Control Leverage... 85
3 A Worthy and Strategic Goal 85
B. THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION AND THE RUSSIAN
SPACE AGENCY 87
1. Revising the Space Station Design 87
2. Russian Contributions to the ISS 89'
C . CONCLUSION 95
1. The Role of the MTCR and the ISS 95
VI . CONCLUSIONS 99
A. OPTIMISM AND JOINT COOPERATION 99
B. THE PROTON 99
C. LACK OF VIABLE ALTERNATIVES 100
D. WHY COMMITMENT TO RUSSIA AND THE RSA MATTERS 101
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 107
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
1. The Sputnik satellite 26
2. Tyuratam (Baikonur) , East of the Aral Sea 56
3. Map of the Baikonur Cosmodrome Facilities 58
4. Baikonur Cosmodrome - another perspective 60
5. Proton D being placed into its vertical launch
position 66
6. The Boeing-contracted, Khrunichev-built FGB 89
7. Artist's conception of Node 1 deployment 90
8. Another perspective of the Node 1 and FGB 91
9. Cut away view of the Service Module 93
10. Another perspective of the Service Module 94
11. Artist's conception of the final configuration
of the ISS 96
LIST OF TABLES
1 . Launch vehicle comparisons 67
LIST OF ACRONYMS




ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle
C&DH Command & Data Handling
C&T Communications and Tracking
CAV Cost Assessment and Validation
CRV Crew Return Vehicle
CSA Canadian Space Agency
EPS Electrical Power System
ESA European Space Agency
EVA Extravehicular Activity
FEL First Element Launch
FGB Functional Cargo Block [sic] (Functionalui
Germaticheskii Block)
FY Fiscal Year
GDR General Designers Review
GFE Government-Furnished Equipment
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GPS Global Positioning System
HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle
ILS International Launch Services
ISS International Space Station
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
KHSC Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
xi
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NAC NASA Advisory Council
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NRL Naval Research Laboratory
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit
PHC Permanent Human Capability
POP Program Operating Plan
RF Russian Federation
RSA Russian Space Agency
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration
SM Service Module
SPP Science Power Platform
STA Structural Test Article
xu
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Illicit Russian ballistic missile technology
proliferation is a serious concern of the United States
government. The Russian Federation's critical role in the
International Space Station and its political and financial
instability has long been a concern of NASA and other
officials of the United States government. The lack of
political stability and the economic uncertainty of the
newly formed Russian Federation wrecked havoc on the old
Soviet space program. There was a flight of specialized
technical personnel from the Soviet space program, wages in
the space industry were unpaid, and the political
disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the
fragmentation of the entire space industry of the old Soviet
Union. Ballistic missile technology control was no longer
centralized and illicit proliferation became a very real
concern to Western powers.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in the fall of
1991, the Western Powers, led most notably by the United
States, have attempted to mitigate the destructive
political, social, and economic forces which were
dramatically undermining the Soviet military, economy, and
social fabric. In an effort to stop the old Soviet space
program from plunging into a cataclysmic spiral of illicit
foreign sales of its ballistic missile technology, and also
to prevent the Russian space infrastructure (launch
xiii
facilities, ground stations, contractors, etc.) from
imploding, the United States entered into a series of
bilateral and multi-national agreements to work with, and to
support the inheritor of the Soviet space legacy: the
Russian Space Agency (RSA) . The ultimate goal of the United
States was to help stabilize the RSA as the Russian
Federation (RF) government attempted to stabilize itself. A
partnership with the Russian Federation involving the
International Space Station can contribute to its viability
and act as a successful leverage against the illicit
proliferation of Russian space and ballistic missile
technology.
There are several compelling strategic reasons to
continue to work closely with the RSA in joint space
endeavors, as well as to financially and technically support
its space infrastructure. Depending on which performance
measures one uses, RSA (and therefore RF) ballistic missile
technology and supporting launch services are in many
respects equal to, if not better than, those of its chief
competitor, the United States. The simplified serial
production philosophy of the Soviet Union with its emphasis
on quantity left the RF well poised to quickly benefit from
foreign ballistic missile technology sales. The RF
inherited a robust satellite reconnaissance design and
manufacturing capability that would also command a high
level of interest on the international market. Drawing on
xiv
the experience and expertise of the RSA, many nations and
competitors can dramatically increase their space
reconnaissance and communications capability in relation to
the United States.
In point of fact, there is no real alternative to a
partnership in the International Space Station (ISS) as
proliferation control leverage with the Russians. The ISS
represents a successful link between national security and
space policies. It is not merely a giveaway to the
Russians, nor should it be viewed as such: the Russians can
and will render significant and highly credible and unique
operational, technical, and scientific contributions to the
ISS. The coupling of diplomatic control over proliferation
as represented by the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) with the operational, financial, and scientific
incentive of participation in the ISS is the ideal manner in
which to engage and monitor the Russians. Partnership in
the ISS will serve as the most effective mechanism by which
to control the dispersion of Russian scientific and
technical expertise. There are added benefits to the ISS
partnership as well.
The Proton Launch Vehicle has the heaviest payload
capability currently being offered on the commercial market.
In addition to the launch flexibility offered by the
Baikonur Cosmodrome and economical reliability of the Proton
launch vehicle, there are additional technical advantages in
xv
working with the RSA. Chief among the advantages are the
RSA' s pre-eminence in deep space communications, its
extensive experience in logistical support and development
of closed-cycle life support systems, and RF advanced
material science technology. These are advantages the US
government and commercial entities are successfully
utilizing right now.
The Russian ability to launch massive payloads into a
low-earth orbit (LEO) with the Proton launch vehicle will
dramatically limit operating costs for the space station.
Perhaps more importantly, Russian commitment to the ISS will
provide a sustained and manageable outlet for Russian
scientific and technical expertise. The Service Module and
Functional Cargo Block (FGB) are the first two critical
elements of the ISS to be built and launched by the Russians
and they represent over one third of the total mass of the
space station. These elements will provide early station-
keeping power and living quarters and are the hub around
which the rest of the ISS will be built.
A partnership with the Russians in the ISS offers real
opportunities for controlling proliferation of Russian
missile and space technology as well as providing unique and
viable contributions to the operational and scientific
success of the space station. How these opportunities are
managed and pursued may well determine each country' s space
legacy for the next millenium.
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
PROLIFERATION
There are valid concerns about whether or not the RF is
committed to controlling its ballistic missile technology
and whether or not it is capable of honoring its obligations
to support the ISS. This chapter presents the basis of
those concerns and how continued support to RF participation
in the ISS is a viable and compelling option which the US
should continue to pursue.
1. India, Iran, and Russian Ballistic Missile
Technology
The recent headlines of American space companies
illegally transferring ballistic missile technology to the
Chinese highlight an eventful and alarming few months.
Space Systems/Loral provided a report to the Chinese on the
causes of an earlier missile failure without first
consulting with federal officials. 1 Equally alarming
proliferation news comes India.
The series of nuclear detonations set off by India in
May only confirmed what arms control and missile technology
1Gerth, Jeff. "Satellite Maker Gave Report to China Before Telling
U.S.,," New York Times, 19 May 1998, 1.
proliferation experts had always suspected: India is intent
on establishing itself as a legitimate nuclear power. India
has been greatly aided by the RF. In March of 1997, the
Russian Space Agency (RSA) agreed to start supplying India
with rocket boosters and related missile technology. 2 In
all probability, qualified Russian personnel aided the
Indians in weapons and program management, helping the
Indians avoid costly and dangerous missteps along the way to
successful detonation of their nuclear devices. The US
reprimanded the RF in 1993 for selling missile technology to
New Delhi and violating the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) accords. 3 There is a long heritage of
military cooperation between India and the Soviet Union (and
now the RF)
.
The Russian reaction to the Indian nuclear detonations
was, interestingly enough, atypical. A week before the
Indian detonations, Russian Federation President Boris
Yeltsin drafted an urgent document calling for the
consolidation of authority over all issues of missile and
space technology proliferation under the sole cognizance of
2Griffin, Jennifer, Untitled, Voice of America (VOA) News Report, 26
March 1997.
3Baksian, Douglas, India Satellite Launch, VOA News Report, 29 August
1997.
the Russian Space Agency. 4 Yeltsin has clearly indicated
he, in fact, had foreknowledge of the nuclear blasts. It is
suspected that Yeltsin made this announcement to diffuse
expected international criticism about Russian support to
the India nuclear detonations.
That Yeltsin categorically addressed the full range of
space and proliferation concerns by granting the RSA such
sweeping technologic and managerial oversight over all
Russian space industries is singularly remarkable. The RSA
will now have authority over, and authority separate from,
the RF Defense Minister and the Federal Service Security
Director. 5 The consequences are extremely significant. In
the endgame of proliferation control, the RSA now has
immense responsibilities; it must not only manage the
Russian space industry, but Russian technology proliferation
concerns as well.
The RSA has inherited a significant proliferation
challenge, and not just as far as the Indians are concerned.
Iran is a leading customer of Russian ballistic missile
technology, as well. Among the Russian firms alleged to
have aided the Iran missile effort are the All Russian
4 Golotyuk, Yuriy, Russia: Space Agency to Acquire ^Special Service' Arm.
FBIS translation of Moscow Russkiy Telegraf, 15 May 98.
5 Ibid.
Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, the All
Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics
(Arzamas-16) , and the Moscow Aviation Institute. 6 Russian
expertise in missile guidance technology, propulsion
technology, and communications support are the most readily
exportable technologies. Regrettably, the Russian
Federation has much to offer would-be ballistic missile
powers
.
2 . Valid Arguments
Russians are currently involved with several high
profile technology transfer issues. Russian expertise in
delivery vehicles for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is
widely known and its nuclear technology is being exported to
India and Iran as these countries try to develop their
nascent nuclear power industries. Russian intelligence
officers were allegedly responsible for smuggling weapons-
grade fissile material into Germany in August of 1994. 7
Perhaps even more alarming is the story of 50 Russian rocket
scientists being apprehended on their way to North Korea. 8
6Odessey, Bruce. Sites in 5 Countries Identified With Weapons
Proliferation, USIA, 30 Jun 97.
7Eggleston, Roland. "Russia: Were Intelligence Officers Involved In
Plutonium Smiggling?", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 Jun 1997.
8U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation and the
Former Soviet Union, U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994,
pp. 32-33.
Russia is a formidable exporter of relatively
sophisticated missile technology and any effort to channel
its proliferation potential towards benign commercial
enterprises should be actively encouraged. Nurturing RSA
participation in the ISS may prove to be the most effective,
if not the only way, to control the proliferation of Russian
space and missile technology.
B. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE
STATION
1. Postponement: of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB)
The M. V. Khrunichev State Space Science and Product
Center (KHSC) announced the long-rumored news in early April
1998. 9 Despite the infusion of over $400 million dollars by
the United States and despite being under the lead
management of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) , the Russian Federation (RF) and the
Russian Space Agency (RSA) postponed the June 28 th launch of
the Functional Cargo Block, known by its Russian acronym,
FGB. The FGB is the first element of the ISS scheduled to
be launched.
9Dmitriyev, Petr. "Rocket Builders Break Their Silence. Space Station
Assembly Finally Postponed Officially," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
April 7 1998, page 2.
The schedule slippage was attributed to the inability
to launch the Russian Service Module in December 1998. This
module is necessary because the FGB cannot exist for an
extended period of time in orbit without its refueling and
station-keeping capability. The RF failure to promptly pay
for the service module directly effects the space station's
life support and re-boost capability. There are other
financial concerns about the RF and RSA as well.
The RSA has still not received almost $45 million from
last year's government budget and it has received only $8
million of its estimated $340 million budget for this
year. 10 The postponing of the launch of the FGB may very
well justify a complete reassessment of the scope and nature
of the relationship between the U.S. and RF in the ISS.
Indeed, there are many scientific, technical, and management
concerns about RF participation in the operational,
technical and management architecture of the ISS.
The critical role played by the Russians in the
International Space Station has long been a concern of NASA
and other officials of the U.S. government. The lack of
political stability and the economic uncertainty of the
newly formed Russian Federation wrecked havoc on the old
10Aerospace Daily, Russia's Station Status On the Line Over Service
Module Delay, The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc, 7 May 1998, p. 211.
Soviet space program. The RF space infrastructure
experienced a severe flight of specialized technical
personnel and intellectual capital from the Soviet space
program, wages in the space industry were unpaid, and the
regional break up of the Soviet Union resulted in the
splintering and fragmentation of the entire space industry
of the old Soviet Union. The US must constructively engage
the inheritor of the Soviet space program, the Russian Space
Agency. The RSA can offer the ISS and the US distinct
technical space advantages as well as an avenue through
which to monitor missile technology proliferation.
There are many concerns about working with the RSA in
any space endeavor whatsoever. Only a year ago US
congressional opponents of the International Space Station
initiated a resolution to end US participation with the
Russians in the Space Station. 11 Despite the estimated cost
of over $17 billion (with current projections running
towards $21 billion) , some argued that the United States and
NASA should run the entire program, without any foreign
1:LU.S. Congress. House. 1997. To terminate the United States
Participation in the International Space Station program. 105 th Cong.,
1
st
sess. , H.R. 1831 IE.
participation at all. The recent release of the detailed
Chabrow Report also supports these arguments. 12
2 . The Chabrow Report
The Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force (CAVTF)
,
headed by Jay Chabrow, an aerospace consultant, provided an
independent review and assessment of the ISS and the Russian
role within it. The Chabrow Report addresses NASA's late
February acknowledgement that the ISS is over its authorized
budget ceiling by $3.7 billion. The cost overruns are
attributed to RF production and testing delays of the
Service Module and the FGB. 13 The Chabrow Report cites RF
participation within the ISS architecture as a major program
risk.
Of the six key findings of the Chabrow Report, the
fourth directly addresses Russian contributions to the space
station. The Chabrow Report states that the schedule
uncertainty associated with Russian implementation of joint
partnership agreements is the major threat to the ISS
12 In September 1997, NASA established a Cost Assessment and Validation
task Force to conduct an independent review and assessment of the cost,
schedule, and partnership performance of the ISS. The task force was
headed by Mr. Jay Chabrow. His goal was to provide advice and
recommendations for improvement of the ISS management structure.
13John C. Henry, "Russian Financial Woes Put Space Station in Jeopardy,'
Houston Chronicle, 23 April 1998, 1 (N) . Also refer to
[http: //www. chron.com: 80/cgi-
bin/auth/story.mpl/ content /chronicle /nation]
.
Program. 14 The inability of the Russian government to pay
its personnel and maintain its space launch capability
directly impacts the ISS program schedule. In point of
fact, one of the closing recommendations of the Chabrow
Report is for the U.S. to invest in developing its own
permanent propulsion and logistics capabilities in order to
mitigate the criticality of reliance on the RF for this
support. 15 The Chabrow Report focused concerns about the
costs and viability of the space station.
3 . Valid Arguments
Opponents of working with the Russians and the RSA
within the current coalition of the ISS do, in fact, voice
very credible concerns. Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)
says that she is running out of patience with the Russians.
She stated that the Russians were invited to participate in
the ISS largely as an inducement to redirect their technical
expertise towards commercial purposes and limit technology
proliferation. She is worried that Russian inability to
support the Space Station may suggest that little or no
progress is being made in the technology proliferation realm
14 Report of the Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force on the
International Space Station, NASA Advisory Council,
[http://www.nasa.gov/cavtf/cavtf l.html ] , page 4.
15 Ibid, 20.
as well. 16 Mikulski questions whether Russia can be counted
on for full and regular support to the ISS when its
technical and management capability, not to mention its
political will, are so highly questionable. The schedule
slippage of the FGB is only one of many concerns.
The problems with integrating the FGB into the ISS are
suggestive of all the ISS-support problems associated with
the RF. First, NASA purchased the module outright from KHSC
for $190 million. NASA then contracted out module upgrades
to Boeing. Boeing then promptly contributed the improved
module to the space station on behalf of the RSA and the
RF. 17 Initial Russian contributions to the ISS have been
problematic at best and far from certain endeavors.
Before addressing other legitimate concerns of RF
ballistic missile technology proliferation and support to
the ISS, a thorough assessment of the RSA and Russian space
capabilities must be done. Knowing the origins and
strengths of the Russian space program will provide a more
balanced perspective on joint cooperation between the United
States and the Russian Federation in the ISS. What are the
origins of the Russian space program, its strengths,
16Henry, 1 (N)
.
17 International Partner Cooperation - Russian Space Agency,
[ http; //station. nasa . gov/reference/status/rsa . html ] , page 1
10
origins of the Russian space program, its strengths,
weaknesses, and potential?
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING OR "IS THE GLASS HALF
FULL OR HALF EMPTY?"
1 . Common Interests
The fall of the Communist Party in the former Soviet
Union permanently altered the paradigm on which US national
space policy was formed. Moving beyond a broad spectrum of
diplomatic and military confrontation and containment, the
US is now working closely with the Russian Federation in
endeavors previously unimaginable. Be it reciprocal fleet
visits to each country's naval bases, mutual support for
NATO enlargement, seeking support for UN efforts in the
Balkans, or multi-corporation, multi-national efforts to tap
the seemingly limitless natural resources of countries of
the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the United States and the
Russian Federation are increasingly likely to constructively
engage each other in military, economic, and technological
matters
.
These shared interests extend well beyond the merely
terrestrial. After forty years of intense, government-
directed competition in space exploration, the United States
and the Russian Federation remain preeminent in the field of
11
space capabilities as well as in the development and
production of space-related technologies. Additionally, the
European Space Agency (ESA) , Japan, and China also have
increasingly capable space programs. The ESA and Japan are
also lead partners with the US and RF in the ISS. Space may
indeed be mankind' s final frontier, but for the United
States and the Russian Federation the exploration of space
may well prove to be the ultimate proving ground for each
country's 21 st century legacy.
2 . Common Concerns
The current setting for these two country' s efforts in
the joint space coalition environment of the ISS could not
be fraught with more anxiety and more consternation. The
Space Station "Mir" has in fact become the "Troubled Space
Station Mir." From oxygen system failures, onboard fires,
power outages, misplaced cables, computer failures,
overworked cosmonauts, and things that go "bump!" in the
night, Mir has become the focus of arguments against Russian
participation in the ISS. Often lost in these arguments is
the fact that Mir is the record holder for longest
continuously manned spacecraft and operating over 6 years
past its original life span. In fact, Astronaut David Wolf,
originally very skeptical of the Mir space station, became
an advocate of the Mir's capabilities. In May of this year,
12
he went so far as to state that the Mir space station
program is a brilliantly conceived program. 18 Given its age
and the harsh environment of space, it is not surprising
that such a complex system experiences such frequent
mechanical problems in the severe environment of space.
Today Russia is a country marked by unpaid wages,
unpaid and uncollected taxes, dubious privatization, a
burgeoning Mafia, and rampant corruption and poverty. 19
There has also been a pronounced flight of human
intellectual capital from the RSA. Working with the
Russians and the RSA is certainly problematic under the best
of circumstances. However, Russian and the RSA have
certainly demonstrated their technical and managerial
resiliency. Their long track record and potential to make
solid contributions to the space achievements well warrant
a role for the RSA in the ISS. If this role can also be
used as leverage to maintain continuity on Russia's
proliferation control efforts, then the argument becomes
more intriguing - and more compelling.
18 Philip Chien, "Space Jalopy," Popular Mechanics, May 1998, 99.
*The Economi
1997, page 2.
19 st , The Endless Winter of Russian Reform (Essay) , July 12
13
D. COMPELLING REASONS
1 . Shoring up the Remains
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in the fall of
1991, the Western Powers, led most notably by the United
States, have attempted to mitigate the destructive
political, social, and economic forces which were
dramatically undermining the Soviet military, economy, and
social fabric. In an effort to stop the old Soviet space
program from plunging into a cataclysmic spiral of illicit
foreign sales of its ballistic missile technology, and also
to prevent the Russian space infrastructure (launch
facilities, ground stations, contractors, etc.) from
imploding, the United States entered into a series of
bilateral and multi-national agreements to work with, and to
support the inheritor of the Soviet space legacy, the
Russian Space Agency (RSA) . The ultimate goal of the United
States was to help stabilize the RSA as the RF government
attempted to stabilize itself. Facilitating the
participation of the RF in the ISS may be the last mechanism
by which Russia's missile technology proliferation may be
tracked and controlled.
14
2 . Strategic Perspective
There are several compelling strategic reasons to
continue to work closely with the RSA in joint space
endeavors, as well as financially and technically support
its space infrastructure. Depending on which performance
measures one uses, RSA (and therefore RF) ballistic missile
technology and supporting launch services are in many
respects equal to, if not better than, those of its chief
competitor, the US. The simplified serial production
philosophy of the Soviet Union with its emphasis on quantity
left the RF well poised to quickly benefit from foreign
ballistic missile technology sales. The RF inherited a
robust satellite reconnaissance design and manufacturing
capability that would also command a high level of interest
on the international market. Drawing on the experience and
expertise of the RSA, many nations and competitors can
dramatically increase their space reconnaissance and
communications architecture capability in relation to the
United States. It is certainly in the best interests of the
United States to be intimately involved with the management
of RF space capabilities, technologies, and policies to any
extent that it can be. The US should not maintain a hands-
off, wait-and-see policy regarding the Russian space program
and its ballistic missile technology, the stakes are too
15
high. Ballistic missile technology proliferation concerns
are indeed enough justification to re-organize the ISS to
integrate the best capabilities of the RF and RSA.
3 . Commercial Perspective
The RSA became the owner of highly reliable launch
vehicles in the Proton and Soyuz rockets and it has also
assumed financial and management responsibilities for the
world's most extensive launch facilities at the Baikonur
Cosmodrome in Tyuratam, Kazakhstan. Given the proliferation
of commercial space communications demands, many foreign and
US firms (and the number increases daily) are eager to take
advantage of the heavy-lift capability of these RSA launch
vehicles. These same launch vehicles are easy to maintain,
highly efficient, and with a ten-year reliability rating of
over 93 percent for the Proton, are the most reliable in the
global space arena. Because the Proton's heavy lift
capability enables it to carry more payload weight per pound
of fuel, it is able to realize dramatic economies of scale
in orbiting costs. The payload to fuel advantage and
benefits resulting from the Proton's serial production
efficiencies have the potential to result in savings of as
much as 20 percent to 40 percent over prevailing Western
16
launch prices (please refer to the table on page 67) . 20
This distinct cost advantage has not been lost on the
international space market; it is widely acknowledged that
RSA possesses one of the most, if not the most, highly
economical and efficient launch vehicles in the Proton.
E. A CLEAR REALITY
The reality is clear. The guidelines of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR - to be discussed in depth
in Chapter V, starting on page 81) regarding the control of
technology proliferation provide the legal and diplomatic
mandate on which to ensure Russian compliance with
controlling its missile and space technology proliferation.
Complementing the diplomatic tenets of the MTCR is the
practical results of partnership within the ISS; the RSA
lies in the critical path for any successful efforts to
support the Space Station Mir and the ISS. Fully one third
of the orbiting mass of the ISS will either be made in
Russia or launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The
operational and management scope of the ISS entails
sophisticated financial and technological commitments from
the three major space agencies (NASA, RSA, and the European
Space Agency, ESA) as well as billion dollar contractual
20Peter B. De Selding, "Proton Pricing Spurs Complaints," Space News, 9
January 1995, 1.
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obligations from hundreds of contractors and sub-contractors
from all over the globe.
The heavy lift capability of the RSA Proton will figure
prominently and critically in all phases of heavy-lift
launch support. At a cost savings of up to $11,000 per
pound over the space shuttle, the Proton and Baikonur offer
the ISS management many degrees of operational freedom at
the lowest price and highest reliability. The RSA is and
will continue to be a significant partner in the operational
and managerial success of the ISS.
Within the operational construct of the ISS space
coalition, there is an obvious need to fully understand all
the technical strengths of the RSA space program. To not be
cognizant of these strengths, to be unaware of program
management vulnerabilities, could well prove to be
disastrous for the timeline, technology, and budget of the
ISS.
F. CONCLUSION
The historical precedents and most notable achievements
of the Soviet space program and its RF descendant, the
Russian Space Agency, warrant closer examination. Careful
analysis will determine the most efficient methodology for
identifying, assessing, and integrating the RSA' s distinct
technological, managerial, and operational advantages into
18
the management and operational infrastructure of the
International Space Station Alpha. But there are
programmatic and policy hazards in doing so.
The alternatives to the ISS partnership are limited.
Withdrawing financial support for the Russians in the ISS
would result in a severe disruption to the ISS schedule.
Replacing the heavy-lift capability of the Proton would be
problematic at best; no other launch vehicle offers the
range of lift capability at such an inexpensive rate (refer
to page 67 on cost comparisons). Because the capabilities
offered by the Russians are so extensively incorporated into
the ISS, the entire scope and design of the space station
would have to be thoroughly redesigned if the Russians were
no longer allowed to participate.
This paper will also present the areas where US
governmental and commercial space ventures are currently
benefiting from certain RSA technical, operational and
managerial capabilities and innovations. There is cause for
optimism in working with the RF and RSA; Russia has the
technical and scientific potential to make unique,
significant contributions to the ISS. This paper will
discuss where the technical and scientific potential of the
RF and RSA can best be realized. To be sure, the path ahead
is fraught with concern. But now, more than ever, the
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institutional leverage required to manage the Russian space
industry and control ballistic missile technology
proliferation appears in place. This paper advocates how to
use that leverage for the ISS and the US as well.
Yeltsin' s decision to place responsibility for
technology proliferation control in the hands of the RSA is
added incentive for the US to form as close a partnership
within the ISS as possible. The issues presented in this
paper will serve as the criteria on which to assess the ISS
partnership with the RSA and to validate the health and
viability of the Russian heavy-lift launch vehicle, the
Proton, and the Russian Federation's premier launch
facility, the Baikonur Cosmodrome. These same issues will
demonstrate that the RF space program and industry do indeed
offer distinct advantages for joint US and RF participation
in the Space Station and that Russia has enormous potential
to render unique contributions to the success of the
International Space Station. Most significantly, to
minimize the potential for illicit missile technology
proliferation, joint participation in the ISS is fully
justified, if not fully required. In order to protect and
ensure its own space legacy, the US and NASA must maintain a
close relationship with the RF space program.
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II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
A. THE GERMAN V-2 ROCKET PROGRAM
1 . The Fight for German Expertise and Personnel
The origins of the current RF space program can be
readily traced back to the closing years of World War II.
From the October 1957 orbiting of Sputnik and the successful
launch and recovery of Yuri Gagarin in 1961 through the
current Space Station Mir of 1998, unique Soviet
circumstances and intense competition with, and paranoia of,
the United States drove the organization and mission of the
Soviet and RF space programs. By describing and discussing
the historical aspects of the old Soviet space program, as
well as gaining insight into its technical culture and
ethos, one can best understand the nature of the current RSA
space program. Given the historical and technical
underpinnings of the early Soviet space program, it will
then be a natural consequence to determine the optimum path
for future mission successes and substantial and productive
scientific gain. This path will point to the way in which a
joint space coalition between NASA and the RSA can best
leverage the most compelling technological advantages of the
Russian space industry, while also ensuring proper attention
is focused on RF ballistic missile technology proliferation.
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The origins of the Soviet Union' s space program emerge
from the conflict of the Second World War and they are quite
similar to those of its Cold War competitor, the United
States. In fact, the birth of both of the Soviet Union's
and the United States' space programs can be traced to the
German Peenemunde V-2 rocket program. Peenemunde was a
German rocket design, test and evaluation facility and live
missile range on the Baltic coast. The lead rocket designer
on the V-2 was the world famous Wernher Von Braun. During
World War II, the strike capability of the V-2 rocket
justifiably caused British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
much anxiety.
The V-2 was truly a revolutionary ballistic missile.
Under the design and supervision of Von Braun and Walter
Theil, the V-2 had the lift capability to carry a one metric
ton payload over 150 miles; London was in striking distance.
It was the first missile to successfully use a turbo-pump
and three-axis stabilized guidance system. 21 Once Churchill
tipped off Stalin about the capabilities and whereabouts of
the V-2 test facility, the Soviets were determined to find
out all they could about this technology, if not control it
themselves
.
21 James Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to
Beat America to the Moon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1997), 65.
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In their sweep across Eastern Europe the Soviets easily
captured Peenemunde and much of the supporting scientific
research personnel and resources. Von Braun ensured he
would be captured by the US by giving US forces his location
and, more importantly, by also giving tantalizing insight
into the nature of his research. 22 The Soviets not only
captured Peenemunde but also some 170 scientists, including
Helmut Grotrupp, the designer of the guidance system of Von
Braun' s V-2 rocket. 23 The treatment the German scientists
and their families received from the US government starkly
differed from the treatment they received from the Soviets.
By all accounts, the Soviets wrung all expertise out of the
Germans, most notably in the areas of instrumentation and
test equipment. Once the Soviets were convinced the Germans
held no further value to their nascent ballistic missile
program, they were repatriated back to (then East) Germany.
By 1954, the last contingent of German scientists had
returned to their Fatherland. 24 In contrast to the Soviets,
the U.S. allowed and encouraged continued German
participation in its missile program for as long as the
22Brian Harvey, The New Russian Space Programme (New York: John Wiley &




Germans themselves wished to contribute. By the end of
World War II, the US and Soviet Union were both employing
and competing for German rocket scientists.
2 . Soviet Motivation for Ballistic Missile Technology
The Soviet drive and almost frenetic need for
technological breakthroughs in ballistic missile
capabilities was all too clear; such technology would
revolutionize their nuclear and non-nuclear strike
capability. German V-2 rocket technology was vitally
required to jump-start each country's nascent ballistic
missile program. The early driving impetus in ballistic
missile technology for the Soviet Union was the absolute
need to develop a transportation vehicle with a significant
heavy-lift capability; Soviet bombers had neither the lift
capability nor the strike range to effectively threaten or
deter would-be enemies, particularly the US. The Soviets
issued a decree calling for the development of ballistic
missiles on 13 May 1946. 25 The ballistic missile arms race
had officially begun.
In essence, the lack of long range lift capability
meant that the Soviet Union did not possess the long-range
nuclear strike capability of its chief competitor, the
United States. The Soviet Union's hydrogen bomb was far too
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massive, far too heavy, and it simply required an extremely
large, powerful rocket to carry it. Having a long range,
nuclear strike capability would go a long way towards
assuaging the Soviet anxiety about combating another
invasion. This deficiency existed until the successful
design and launch of the Soviet R-7 rocket.
The R-7 was Sergei Korolev' s brainchild. On 21 August
1957, an R-7 carried a dummy warhead an intercontinental
distance of over 4,000 miles. 26 In grooming their program
for heavy-lift rocket launches to carry the hydrogen bomb
over intercontinental distances, the Soviet Union
serendipitously prepared itself to naturally transition to
manned space flights. The significant thrust ability of the
R-7 could also be easily used to launch much lighter
satellites and spacecraft into outer space. If the rocket
had enough thrust for the Soviet Union' s massive hydrogen
bomb, it could also be used to support space flight and
space exploration. Launching a cosmonaut with all the
required ancillary support equipment into orbit was a





lift rockets. 27 The emerging Cold War rivalry between the US
and the Soviet Union influenced the very design and
production philosophy of Soviet space managers. The first
satellite placed in orbit, Sputnik, represents this
production philosophy (see Figure 1) .
B. SPUTNIK HO!
Figure 1. The Sputnik Satellite. (Image of Sputnik I model
courtesy of National Air and Space Museum)
In an effort to inundate and impress putative Western
competitors, Soviet space managers placed an absolute
premium on production speed and quantity of their space
27 U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. US-Russian




products. They wanted to launch as many rockets, to place
in orbit as many satellites and cosmonauts as possible - in
absolutely minimal time. They also programmed an emphasis
on immediate replenishment or replacement of space personnel
or space resources.
The early spacecraft of the Soviet space program were
not designed to long endure the rigors of the space
environment. After launching Sputnik in October 1957, they
launched three others within seven months as well as
attempting nine moon launches over a two and a half year
period from October 1957 until April I960. 28 Because the
Soviets opted for shorter design life spans for all of their
satellites, minimal replacement time was an absolute
imperative of the supporting space architecture. It is
highly doubtful that the Soviets correctly anticipated the
rapid obsolescence of many of today's space systems. There
priority was to place satellites in orbit as quickly as
possible, certainly before the US. In any case, the end
result of the government's emphasis to replace failing
satellites in minimal time was the Soviet Union's remarkable
ability to streamline the production process and launch
replacement satellites in as little as 48 hours. This is a
28Harvey, 33,
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technological accomplishment still unmatched by any other
space agency on earth.
C. TECHNICAL CULTURE AND ETHOS
1 . Brute Force and Quantity over Quality
The competitive political and military environment
between the Soviet Union and the United States resulted in
the Soviet Union placing the highest priority for its early
space program on heavy-lift launches and extremely
responsive, streamlined production processes. With these
two aspects dominating the scientific and technical culture
of the Soviet space program, what were its most conspicuous
achievements in the early exploration of space?
The early efforts which culminated in the launching of
Sputnik I demonstrate the sense of priorities of the early
Soviet space program. The original plan was to orbit a 1.5
ton scientific research satellite onboard an R-7 launch
vehicle. However, in the interest of speed and design ease,
Sergei Korolev, the director of the division for long range
missiles 29 within the Scientific Research Institute, opted
to place into orbit a much simpler spacecraft. Sputnik was
a simple, spherical radio transmitter that weighed a mere 83
29Ibid, 14.
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kilograms (about 180 pounds). 30 When the "beep, beep, beep"
of Sputnik's transmitted signal was received on earth, the
drive to place satellites in orbit for the express purpose
of the exploration of space had officially begun. The next
satellite launch of the Soviets, Sputnik II, showed the
earnestness of the Soviet program.
Sputnik II weighed more than ten times the amount of
Sputnik I and carried a dog as a passenger. The Soviets
launched Sputnik II a mere 30 days after Sputnik I. The
emphasis on simple design and serial production enabled the
Soviets to stake an early lead in the space race with the
United States. These aspects of the technical and
engineering culture of the Soviet space program carried over
into the Soviet's manned spaceflight efforts.
2 . Staying with the Tried and True
The Soviets rarely strayed from the tried and true: in
fact, earlier design commitments long dictated subsequent
design considerations. The progress of Soviet space
technology proceeded carefully along an evolutionary path,
rather than a revolutionary path. Because the early Soviet
space program enjoyed the benefits of the heavy-lift
capability of rockets such as the R-7, there was far less of
30 Ibid, 22.
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a design premium placed on component weight reduction and
miniaturizing electronics. Even now, Russian space
electronics are extremely crude and cumbersome by Western
space standards. The Soviets used vacuum tube technology
long after the U.S. had transitioned to solid state
devices. 31 There simply was no concerted effort, no
incentive, to incorporate weight-reducing designs into
proven systems. There was a systematic dearth of innovation
in the Soviet Space program.
The simple approach clearly applied to spacecraft
design as well. Designing a spacecraft to carry humans and
successfully re-enter the earth's atmosphere was critical.
If the heat shields were not properly designed and placed on
the re-entry vehicle, the craft could burn up upon re-entry.
The early American efforts involved numerous wind-tunnel
tests of a bullet-shaped re-entry vehicle. In addition to
determining the correct layering and placement of heat
shields, the American design required a meticulously
executed re-entry; the design of the heat shields was
optimized for a specific flight path. Flying a bullet-
shaped re-entry vehicle in one specific direction to
optimize heat shield design required an extremely precise
and accurate design. As often as not, the Soviet space
310ffice of Technology Assessment, 26.
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program bypassed, rather than mastered, precision science
requirements
.
Korolev approached the same problem in a far different
fashion. He opted to design the re-entry vehicle as a
perfect sphere and heavily weighed one face (the leading
edge) of the spacecraft with the protective heat shields.
The gravitational vector of the earth would always act on
the heavier half of the re-entry vehicle. In effect the
gravitational force of the earth would direct the motion of
the spacecraft, rather than cosmonauts onboard. Korolev
would let the laws of physics and gravity correctly "pull"
the spacecraft back into the earth's atmosphere. The
concept was charming in its simplicity and it worked
flawlessly. 32
There were other stark differences between the early
space programs of the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Soviets opted for territorial landings vice landings at
sea. The reasons for this stemmed from the Soviets lack of
maritime wherewithal and an almost paranoid desire to
maintain the strictest sense of secrecy about their space
efforts
.
While its simplicity and speed distinguished the
science of the early Soviet space program, and while the
31
manufacturing process emphasized quantity over quality, the
economic underpinnings of the Soviet space program are
harder to fathom. More insight can be gained into the later
challenges to the RSA by examining the financial
underpinnings of the early Soviet space program.
3. Early Soviet Space Budget
In the Soviet Union there was a single space budget
that supported all military space efforts; there were no
purely civilian space initiatives. 33 In fact, both the
nominally civilian and military space entities largely
shared the same infrastructure, design bureaus and
personnel. Because no truly independent and functional
legislature was ever established in the Soviet Union, the
Communist Party directly shunted money on an ad hoc basis
from the government to individual design bureaus. The
economics of communism and the vagaries of the Soviet
government did not allow for the use of traditional R&D and
procurement financial models. A Communist Party order was
sent from the Politburo to the "official" governmental body,
the Council of Ministers, to build a specific space system.
Money was then appropriated and allocated to the Ministry of
General Machine Building. This Ministry was responsible for
32 Ibid, 35.
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deciding which design bureau would best fulfill the system
specifications. The military had the sole power of
accepting or rejecting an entire missile system before it
ever went into production. The lack of independent
oversight of the Soviet space program by civilian
authorities ensured that the military dominated all aspects
of design and production of Soviet space capabilities.
The original funding would also include obligations for
testing and evaluating the particular space system. It is
important to note that if the tests went well, the Military
Industrial Commission would initiate large-scale production.
There was absolutely no hint of independent, outside control
(civilian or military) of testing, validating, or management
oversight whatsoever. Once funding was allocated to the
appropriate design bureau the system went forward and was
sustained by its own momentum. There was no life cycle cost
management in the Western sense. Programs rarely ended;
they were often folded into emerging programs which built




Because the climate and nature of communism in the
Soviet Union system did not readily allow for, let alone
330ffice of Technology Assessment, 26-27
33
encourage, a process of continual innovation and
improvement, a previously approved space system was often
adapted to other space objectives with little or no
modifications to the original blueprints. However, the
original requirements and design goals usually ended up
significantly modified, or "cross-decked". The spacecraft
design that carried Yuri Gagarin into orbit was later
modified to serve as a photo-reconnaissance platform.
Soviet space engineers were able to "cross-deck" system
designs for multiple missions with minimal engineering re-
work and minimal costs. This is a constant theme of the
technical culture of the early Soviet space program. This
meant that modified, workable systems were usually fielded
in relatively short time periods. 34 The overall mindset of
Soviet Space officials can be summed up as emphasizing
quantity over quality, and exhibiting an overwhelming desire
to always beat the US.
The early origins of the Soviet Union's Space Program
can be traced historically to the end of World War II and,
politically, to the growing, world-wide competition with,
and paranoia of, the US. The economic foundations of the
space program are difficult to credibly document, but the
Soviet Union probably outspent the United States in relative
34 Ibid, 27.
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space expenditures by a ratio of 3:2, with over 65 percent
of these expenditures going to military space applications,
representing approximately .29 percent of the GNP. 35 The
production philosophy was unsophisticated and made its mark
in volume, but not quality or sophistication. From
organizational management, to scientific and technical
support, to budgetary commitments, the entire span of Soviet
space activities was dominated by, and completely
subordinated to, military priorities and applications. The
Russian Federation inherited unique capabilities from the
Soviet Union.
35These assesments are culled from the OTA report on the Russian space
program. Refer to pages 29 to 37.
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III. THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY
A. ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY
1 . The Demise of the Soviet Union
The Russian Space Agency was established in a political
and social environment filled with turmoil and danger. How
the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin confronted the
challenge of stabilizing the remains of the Soviet space
program speaks volumes of the politics and economics in
Russia, both then and today. Understanding this challenge
will provide insight into the resiliency of the Russian
space program.
Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the fall of
1991, the old Soviet space program found itself as
fragmented as the newly organized Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) . The flagship launch complex at
Baikonur, Kazakhstan was no longer readily available; it
belonged to Kazakhstan and not Russia. The former Soviet
Union' s premier launch facilities were not immediately at
the disposal of the RSA. The primary design and
manufacturing facility of NPO Yuzhnoye and its 30,000
employees were outside of Russian sovereignty, in Ukraine.
The loss of NPO Yuzhnoye and its personnel represented more
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than just a loss to the space manufacturing capability of
the RF.
Because NPO Yuzhnoye also produced remote sensing,
intelligence, and weather satellites, the loss of these
technologies was keenly felt by the RSA. Fully one third of
the spacecraft command and control centers were in Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Sensitive space
surveillance facilities were located in Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
Latvia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Armenia. 36 Because of
the widespread dispersion of vital elements of the old
Soviet space program, the RSA of the Russian Federation
first had to retrench and reorganize its space activities
before resuming an active presence in its former space
endeavors
.
2 . Two Steps Backwards
In an effort to recombine the former elements of the
Soviet space program, the Russian Federation spearheaded an
effort to form a cooperative relationship among space
entities of the CIS. In 1992 ten members of the former
Soviet Union agreed to support a unified space program for
the CIS. This agreement never produced tangible, successful
results; the governments of its constituent members were
360ffice of Technology Assessment, 27
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overwhelmed by the traumatic responsibilities of
transitioning to new governing bodies to properly focus
their energies and resources on space initiatives. In fact
the Russian Federation inexorably assumed the dominant lead
in space activities of the former Soviet Union, as much by
default as by design. 37 Frustrated by officials of the
Kazakhstan Space Agency and its control of the Cosmodrome at
Baikonur, Russia opted to lease the launch facility for at
least the next twenty years.
3 . One Step Forward
Many of the command and control stations outside of
Russia proper have gradually been taken offline and replaced
with space-based auto-relay satellites. 38 Russia is also
leasing the supporting test ranges in Kazakhstan. Upon the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took the lead in
recombining the most important elements of the former Soviet
space program into its own area of responsibility. The
next phase in the emergence of the RSA involves the powerful
role politics and economics played in stabilizing the
resources and focusing the management of the RSA and the
5nJ U.S. Congress. Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Space
Activities of the United States, Soviet Union, and Other Launching
Countries: 1957-1993, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office April
1994, 106.
380ffice of Technology Assessment, 129,
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supporting Russian space infrastructure. These efforts all
came together in an entirely new organization, with a new
charter and a growing commitment to a new, Western-style
business approach.
B. POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
1 . A Legislative , Vice Military , Mandate
President Yeltsin created the Russian Space Agency in
February of 1992. More significantly, it was the
legislative branch of the new Russian government that gave
the RSA its official charter; no longer would space efforts
serve merely as an adjunct to military planning and
capabilities. Under the old regime of the Soviet Union, no
single agency was responsible for formulating, coordinating,
and implementing all aspects of government space policy. 39
The mission of the RSA was to "make effective use of
Russia's space rocket complex in the interests of the
Russian Federation's socio-economic development, security,
and international cooperation." 40 It was legislated as a
separate, stand-alone line item in the government's budget
and its organizational structure is highly suggestive of
390ffice of Technology Assessment, 31.
40Russian Federation President. Decree Establishing the Russian Space
Agency, Moscow, February 1992. Boris Yeltsin.
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NASA's organization. The RSA represents a dramatic break
from its Soviet heritage in several important regards.
Under the reorganization of the Russian space program,
the civil and military spheres of responsibilities are
clearly delineated. Even though the military still warrants
the lion's share of financial resources, military personnel
are gradually being winnowed away from all launch and
operations facilities. Civilian personnel will be eased-in
as military personnel are eased-out. Ultimately, civilian
personnel will be responsible for the maintenance and
operation of all commercial satellites, providing support to
the Space Station Mir, and for also providing support and
launch services for the ISS. An obvious priority of the
Russian Federation has been to eliminate the military
hegemony of its space activities. From budget allocation to
personnel manning, Russian civilians are increasingly more
and more visible within the RSA.
2 . Western-Supported Technology Transfer
The new charter of the RSA has also allowed for ready
access of launch service technology by interested Western
parties (both governmental and private interests) . Because
the military's role has been (and continues to be) de-
emphasized and separated, the transfer of sensitive
technology is easier to control. It is also far easier for
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elements of the civilian RSA to initiate cooperative
ventures with NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) . The
RSA has in fact become a clearinghouse for any organization
desiring to do business with Russia in any commercial space
endeavor. 41
Before it can stabilize and grow through consolidation,
the RSA must carefully assess the current economic
environment. Funding for space programs declined
dramatically in the six-year period ending 1995. Over this
same time period - and relative to GNP - the space budget
contracted to 0.29 percent from an estimated 0.73 percent,
or from $3.9 billion to $.69 billion, considered in pre-
reform rubles. 42 RSA must also address concurrent drawdowns
in other aspects of its space mission. R&D programs have
fallen off by more than two thirds (197 R&D programs to 76),
percent of spacecraft operating beyond warranty has
increased from 30 percent to 59 percent, and new system
development has skyrocketed from an average duration of 6-8
years to greater than 15. 43
41 Ibid., 33.
42M. V. Tarasenko, Current Status of the Russian Space Program, Space
Policy, Volume 12, Number 1, February 1996, 22.
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3. RSA and the Impact of Privatization
RSA should be an effective stabilizer as more
industries and enterprises of the Russian government are
privatized. In the privatization of Russia's most prominent
space enterprise, Energiya Scientific Production
Organization, ownership of 38 percent of the company was
maintained by RSA. RSA oversaw the disposition of the
remaining 62 percent, including the 25 percent represented
by privatization vouchers. As Russian aerospace companies
become more financially secure and established within the
international commercial market, the extent to which RSA has
to continue to subsidize the supporting infrastructure will
decrease. In the interim, RSA will act as the only filter
and stabilizer as Russian Space entities shed government
ownership and become privatized. 44 With the RSA now having
authority over technology proliferation as well, it has
additional leverage to control the privatization process.
Having achieved equilibrium of sorts in privatization, RSA




4 . Russian Federation Financial Delinquency
Difficulties confront the RSA along all fronts of
production and many of these difficulties are directly-
attributable to non-payment of bills to contractors and sub-
contractors by the RF government. A prime contractor has to
account for delayed payments from RSA for its Soyuz
launchers. This same contractor is in no hurry to pay its
subcontractor (s) . Financial duress and uncertainty permeate
the contractor and subcontractor relationship network.
Three dozen enterprises subordinate to RSA have a cumulative
debt of 500 billion pre-reform rubles while the government
owes them close to 470 billion pre-reform rubles
(approximately $100 billion) . Salaries in the space
industry are nearly 25 percent lower than those in non-
defense industries. Actual payments of salaries are often
delayed as well. As one might expect, there is a
significant loss of personnel and expertise in the space
industry. By the end of 1994, employment in the space
sector had declined to 65 percent of its 1989 level. In
fact, many of the "employed" merely use the space job as an
anchor while they pursue more profitable business
440ffice of Technology Assessment, 33,
44
opportunities elsewhere. 45 These problems are not trivial,
but there is a very real sense that the worst may be over.
5. Causes for Optimism
The new management structure of the Russian space
program as represented by the RSA offers several reasons for
optimism. The RSA continues to successfully distance itself
away from military control and military concerns. It has
its own charter, sanctioned by a legislative body, the
Russian Duma, and it is solely responsible for all aspects
of Russian space policy. It is serving as a ready and able
conduit for Western commercial space interests and has been
highly effective in initiating cooperative ventures with
NASA and the ESA. Because it is now in control of all
aspects of space system development, it can take advantage
of previously unrealized economies of scale. As the lead
agent in privatizing space enterprises, it can best manage
each space company's transition to a market economy. It is
indeed well positioned to nurture and manage the continued
growth of the Russian space program. As RSA shores up the
remains of the Soviet space program it will increasingly




As the RSA consolidated its position as preeminent
among space organizations of the former CIS it had to
confront significant challenges. While adjusting to
dramatically reduced state contracts, hyperinflation, and
essentially a complete breakdown in traditional supplier and
customer networks, RSA was left wanting when it came time to
gain Western technical and financial support for its space
endeavors. In fact, many elements of the RSA felt that
further contacts with Western commercial interests were
fruitless unless hard currency was provided upfront.
Because the RSA was often reluctant to provide detailed
financial and technical information for the would-be
investors, no investment occurred. 46 Hard currency was not
to be realized in the Russian market either. On the heels of
the dissolution of the USSR, there was a gradual realization
that there had been no accumulation of capital by any sector
of the economy. Now, however, Russian banks figure
prominently into the financial viability of the RSA
commercial space efforts.
The basic mechanisms of a market economy are quickly
emerging in Russia. Russia now has about 2,500 licensed
commercial banks (of which some 500 are allegedly owned by
the mafia, or have prominent mafia-ties) , 600 investment
460ffice of Technology Assessment, 57
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funds and 40 million shareholders. 47 Privatization has
proceeded rapidly as well. Over 15,000 medium and large
enterprises have been offered to shareholders.
Proportionately, Russia's state-owned sector is less than
Italy's. 48 Because Russians save as much as 33 percent of
GDP, Russian banks now have significant capital reserves
available for market entrepreneurs and risk-takers. Capital
accumulation has slowly developed and the RSA must work with
the banks in tapping this financial resource.
The RSA is compelled to look outward, to the market for
capitalization and marketing of its cooperative space
ventures. Unlike the US space program which accounts for
roughly 0.5 percent of GNP (around $30 billion), the Russian
Federation space program is suffering personnel downsizing,
technology proliferation issues, and a significant exodus of
experienced personnel (including engineers) out of its space
industries. 49 Additionally, because the space design
bureaus once predominantly specialized in specific
equipment, with a narrow range of possible applications,
they have been slow to adapt to an open field of competitive
opportunities. The RSA is in dire need of some old-
47 The Economist, A Silent Revolution (Essay), April 8 1995, 1,
48 Ibid.
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fashioned venture capital firms to get its initiatives off
the ground.
C . CONCLUSION
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the old Soviet
space program, the RF government undertook significant
actions to stabilize the precarious state of its space
industry and those of the members of the CIS. Although this
process is by no means complete, and the final stabilization
of the RSA and RF space industries remains problematic, the
trendline is positive. There are indeed reasons to be
optimistic about the projected end state of the RSA and RF
space capabilities within the management structure of the
ISS.
As the RSA increases its international commercial
activity, there are opportunities for profitable interaction
with private interests. Bear in mind that it was only in
1992 that a consortium of Russian space enterprises,
Informcosmo, signed its first contract with the US Company
Rimsat for the production of Gorizont communications
satellites. These satellites were successfully launched two
years later and serve customers in India, Malaysia, and
49Grigori S, Khozin, Russian Space Commercialization - getting the banks
involved, Space Policy 1996, Volume 12, Number 3, 157.
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Taiwan. 50 Russian banks have yet to fully prove their
viability in financing space activities, but they are
nevertheless important strategic partners for RSA in
carrying its space initiatives forward.
Concerns about proliferation of Russian ballistic
missile technology are serious enough to offset the risks
posed by a partnership with the Russians in the ISS.
50Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, page 133
49
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IV. RUSSIAN FEDERATION SPACE CAPABILITIES
A. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RUSSIAN SPACE PROGRAM
1 . A Typical Space Architecture
Before beginning the analysis of the current RSA space
program, a proper sense of the functionality of a typical
space mission architecture should be presented and
discussed. Analyzing the role and capabilities of the RSA
within this architecture will then be a more natural
process; and it will be subsequently easier to analyze and
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the RSA.
The mission concept, that is, the overall goal of the
space system, defines the entire scope of the space mission
architecture. Typical examples of a mission concept are
global cellular communications, imagery satellites, weather
satellites, network television satellites, etc. There are
seven sub-components 51 of a space mission architecture:
(1) Subject.
(2) Space Segment (Payload and Spacecraft Bus)
.
(3) Orbit and Constellation.
(4) Launch Segment.
(5) Command, Control, and Communications Architecture.
51Larson, Wiley J. and Wertz, James R. editors, Space Mission Analysis




The RSA has inherent strengths and commercial and
scientific applicability in some of these sub component
areas, weaknesses in others, and little or no commercial
applicability in the rest. What elements make up these sub-
component areas?
The subject of the mission answers the question: "What
information will the satellite provide that achieves our
goal, what function will the satellite perform?" 52 It could
be terrain by a geo-mapping satellite, temperature and
pressure by a weather satellite, a rocket plume by a missile
detection satellite, etc. Depending on the answer to this
question, the RSA may or may not have a significant role in
the subject definition. (This is certainly the case in the
realm of satellite communications where the subject is
almost always defined by commercial consortiums like Bill
Gates' Teledesic and Motorola's Iridium.) The payload is
another sub-component largely determined by the primary user
of the space system. The payload portion of the space
segment represents the aggregate hardware and software
52 Ibid. In fact, all sub-component definitions in this section are
derived from Wiley and Larson. The "SMAD" is an essential tool in
comprehending the overall methodology and physics involved in
translating an idea or goal into a viable space system. It is a superb
reference tool and highly informative.
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systems that sense or interact with the subject. On an
international or joint commercial venture, the RSA will
often have little or no impact in this design area. The
last sub-component area where the RSA will have little or no
impact is in the orbit constellation design. Constellation
design is a direct function of the subject and payload
capabilities. If the designers want to target only one
specific part of the globe, all the time, then a geo
stationary satellite is preferred. If the goal is to get
wide area coverage, with long dwell time, then a highly
elliptical orbit is preferred. There is little or no
likelihood that the RSA would be a significant factor in
subject definition, payload architecture and constellation.
The commercial market will largely determine the design and
innovation in these sub-component areas. Because of its
historic emphasis on military applications, these commercial
sub-component areas are not the RSA's strongest selling
points
.
2 . Russian Strengths within the Space Architecture
The launch segment is the most readily identifiable
"space system" of any space architecture. It includes the
launch facility, launch vehicle, and any upper stage vehicle
required to place the satellite or spacecraft system in a
particular orbit. The launch segment also includes
53
associated ground support equipment and facilities. The RSA
launch segment has two very successful elements, the very
reliable Proton rocket and the robust launch facilities at
the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Tyuratam, Kazakhstan. These two
elements are proving to be among the most common variables
in international space ventures and they also figure
prominently in plans for the ISS. The facilities at
Baikonur and the Proton launch vehicle will be examined in
detail in the next two sections.
The Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
architecture is the arrangement of components which satisfy
the mission's C3 requirements. It requires specifications
on data rate delivery and the nature of the system interface
with space and ground assets. Because of the extensive
nature of the old Soviet space program, the RSA has a wealth
of C3 experience and existing communications infrastructure
that can be readily tapped into for new space systems.
There is a minimal learning curve involved with the RSA in
C3 architecture design and application. Similarly, the
ground segment, which commands and tracks the spacecraft, is
well defined within the RSA program. If these assets are
managed properly, the US and other coalition partners, as
well as commercial entities, can realize significant
economies of scale by judiciously utilizing pre-existing RSA
54
facilities and communications networks- Finally, mission
operations consist of the people occupying the ground and
space segments, the mission operations concept, procedures,
and data flow. Because the C3 architecture is a significant
part of mission operations, the RSA may have a significant
role in this sub-component area as well.
The methodology for identifying, assessing, and
integrating the RSA distinct technological, managerial, and
operational advantages will be developed in the areas the US
and ISS are most likely to draw upon for their space
initiatives: the launch facilities at Baikonur and the
Proton rocket launch vehicle. For the RSA and the ISS to
truly be successful and conduct sustained commercial and
scientific endeavors in the 21 st century the inherent
capabilities and advantages of the Baikonur launch
facilities and the Proton launch vehicle must be fully
understood and fully leveraged. The key for the US space
program and other users will be how to determine the nature
of a successful relationship with the RSA, the advantages in
doing so, and the identification of any possible hazards in
working with the RSA.
55

B. BAIKONUR LAUNCH FACILITY
1 . Location and Early History
The Baikonur Cosmodrome is the world' s oldest space
launch facility, ground having first been broken on 1 May
1955. The name "Baikonur" is actually a misnomer. Baikonur
is a small mining town located some 370 km northeast of the
facility. The actual Cosmodrome is located in Tyuratam,
near present day Leninsk (see Figure 2) . The deception was
Figure 2. Tyuratam (Baikonur), East of the Aral Sea.
intentional. The Soviets hoped to delay and confound the
discovery of the launch facilities by US and NATO
reconnaissance assets for as long as possible. Misnaming
56

and misplacing geographical locations was part of this
deception.
The original concept of Baikonur called for a facility
less susceptible to US surveillance and closer to the
equator. Such a move to more southern latitudes enabled
Soviet ballistic missile engineers to gain increased liftoff
velocities for their rockets due to the increased velocity
of the earth closer to the equator. This increased take-off
velocity provided a 4 percent payload bonus compared to the
other Soviet alternative of Kapustin Yar. 53 The initial
scale of construction was extensive: in addition to the
world's largest launch pad (45m deep by 250m long by 100m
wide) for the R-7, the early Cosmodrome facility included an
airport and hangar bay assembly. It has grown considerably
since the launch of Sputnik I in October of 1957 and there
is good reason why it is the crown jewel of the RSA space
program.
2 . Launch History and Capabilities
The Baikonur Cosmodrome is the world's oldest space
launch facility and it has over 1,000 successful space
launches to its credit. It routinely leads the world in the




launch year ending 1996. 54 Baikonur can readily support
such a robust optempo because of its size and capability to
support a variety of launch vehicles. Covering a land mass
of over 2,700 square miles, this facility consists of nine
launching pads with 14 launching tables, 34 technical
complexes, two airfields, a launch tracking center, three
filling stations for spacecraft and the world's largest oxy-
nitrogen plant. Figure 3 offers another perspective of the
Baikonur Cosmodrome.
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Figure 3. Map of the Baikonur Cosmodrome Facilities
54 U.S. Congress. House. Oversight Visit. Baikonur Cosmodrome. House




However, Baikonur also supports the Soyuz and Molniya series
of launch vehicles as well as the Tsiklon and Energiya
series. 55 A truly massive complex, it is an entire city
dedicated to the single industry of launching rockets.
The extensive support facilities of the Baikonur
Cosmodrome, its ability to support a variety of launch
missions (supporting payloads from 2 tons to 88 tons) and
its 40+ launches per year, 1000 launch experience have made
it a dominant player in the international market for launch
services. Baikonur will support all the heavy lift
requirements of the ISS, and 30 percent of the total
launches for the space station between 1998 and 2000.
Commercial consortiums are also eager to use the facilities
at Baikonur, with Motorola's Iridium system relying on
Baikonur to launch 21 of its 66-satellite network. On 7
April 1998, Proton successfully completed its last launch of
Motorola's Iridium satellites. The Proton placed almost one
third of the constellation, 21 satellites altogether, in
orbit for Iridium. 56
55Office of Technology Assessment, 37.





Baikonur covers a greater land area than the city of
Chicago. It represents a 40+ year effort to support all
aspects of a space launch. When viewed from another
perspective, the sheer versatility and massive complexity of
the Cosmodrome facility awes its visitors as well as its
full time residents. Figure 4 offers another perspective of
the capabilities and extensiveness of the Baikonur
Cosmodrome. The numerous facilities highlight its multiple
mission capability and extensive infrastructure.
"Rokot" launch vehicle Airfield






Figure 4. Baikonur Cosmodrome - another perspective.
For the RSA, the Baikonur Cosmodrome is starting point
for all man and man related lunar, interplanetary, high-
60

altitude, and geo-synchronous missions. 57 Despite, or
perhaps because of, the prominent role of this facility in
the Soviet space program, Baikonur's role in international
launch services since the fall of the Soviet Union has been
anything but certain.
3 . Impact of the dissolution of the Soviet Union
The break up of the Soviet Union jeopardized the
complex infrastructure of the Baikonur facilities and, in
fact, Baikonur is a case in point for concerns about the
RSA's decaying space infrastructure. Because of the dispute
between government officials of Kazakhstan and Russia,
Baikonur's already utilitarian facilities rapidly
deteriorated. There have been news reports that the
infrastructure is indeed deteriorating and that many
facilities and work centers lack central heat, electricity,
running water, and are in severe disrepair. 58 These
conditions and lack of pay have exacerbated an already
discontented work-force at Baikonur. There have also been
strikes and protests about the working and living conditions
at the facilities and in the neighboring town of Leninsk,
where many workers live. There have even been reports of
57 Federation of American Scientists, Space Launch Vehicles,
[http: //www. fas.org/spp/guide/russia/launch]
.
58Michael Specter, "Where Sputnik Once Roared into History, Hard Times
take Hold," The New York Times, 21 March 1995, section CI.
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thieves using camels to pull copper cable out of the ground
and selling it for its value as a raw material. One launch
at Baikonur was reportedly cancelled due to the theft of
specialized support equipment. 59 Officials are also
grappling with larger social issues that effect the
readiness posture of Baikonur.
During the wrangling between the two governments,
neither government controlled the administration of the
city. Thousands of nomadic Kazakhs subsequently entered the
city and now occupy former dwellings left vacant by the
departed Soviet Space Forces. In a city once dominated by
Russians, Kazakhs now make up over 50 percent of the
population. 60 Although these reports are more symptomatic
of the state of the space program upon the dissolution of
the Soviet Union rather than a reflection of Baikonur in
1998, there are legitimate concerns that the RSA will not be
able to respond to the challenges of modernizing the
Baikonur facilities.
4 . Causes for Optimism
The first step to the restoration of Baikonur was
resolving the relationship between the Russian Federation
59Vladimir Ardayev, "Kazakhstan: Depressing Landscape With Fireworks,
Isvetiya (Moscow), 3 November 1994, page 4. (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service translated text.)
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and Kazakhstan. On 28 March 1994 Russia agreed to lease the
Baikonur Cosmodrome from the government of Kazakhstan for
twenty years at a price of approximately (US$) 115 million
per year. 61 Russia's government and the RSA immediately
began to bolster the facilities' infrastructure and
commercial prospects. In an attempt to facilitate the
transition to commercial enterprises, the Russian military
presence is being gradually reduced while the civilian staff
is being increased. The Russian government of Boris Yeltsin
has also pledged financial and material support to the city
of Leninsk as well as allocating sufficient funds to
construct new housing for the 16,000 military troops who
support Baikonur. Emphasis has been placed on utilizing,
maintaining, upgrading, and retooling the space facilities
at Baikonur. 62 Commercial investment quickly followed on
the heels of government investment.
60Peter De Selding, "Baikonur Undergoing Profound Transition," Space
News, 11 September 1995, page 4.
61Office of Technology Assessment, 36.
62Russian Federation President. Russian Presidential Edict No 2005
(Boris Yeltsin) and Russian Federation Government (Duma) Decree 996 of
24 October 1994 and 29 August 1994, respectively. These two documents
commit the President and RF government to ensuring the viability of all
aspects of the Baikonur facilities. They both address quality of life
issues for servicemen of the Military Space Forces, as well as
addressing operational expenditures, purchases of series-produced space
equipment, capital construction and upkeep for the city of Leninsk. The
RSA and RF are clearly leaving nothing to chance in an effort to ensure
the long term viability of Baikonur.
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Lockheed Aerospace is building a satellite processing
facility and a second Proton launch pad at Baikonur at an
estimated price of $100 million. The two projects will be
completed this year and they will significantly increase the
viability of Baikonur in the commercial launch industry.
Indeed, with the successful launch of its Iridium payload
for Motorola, more and more commercial endeavors are
focusing on the capabilities of the Baikonur launch
facilities
.
C. PROTON LAUNCH VEHICLE
1. Launch History and Capabilities
The Proton is the largest launch vehicle in the RSA
inventory and it currently has the heaviest payload
capability offered on the commercial market. 63 The Proton
is used in the three stage variant to place payloads in low
earth orbits and in the four stage configuration to launch
heavier spacecraft into higher orbits. 64 The Proton has the
most launches in space history to its credit (238). 65 It
63The Buran Energiya (Angara 5) will have a Geosynchronous payload of
twice that of the Proton (roughly 5 tons to 2.5 tons). However its
operational effectiveness has not been tested in actual orbit and its
commercial viability is far from certain.
64 Eric F. Laursen and John E. Voce, The Proton Launch Vehicle System
-thCurrent Status, 16 International Communications Satellite System
Conference, February 1996, page 2.
65M. V. Sinelshchikov, "Russian Launch Vehicles' State of the Art and
Lines of their Improvement, ESA pub, SP-362, March 1994, 7.
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has been in production since the mid 1960's, and its current
variant, K, is quickly being recognized as the most
reliable, cost effective launch vehicle offered on the
commercial market.
The Proton is the world' s pre-eminent space launch
vehicle. No other launch vehicle has the ability to place
payloads of such varying weight into so many different
orbits. It can place a 23 ton payload in a low earth orbit,
an 8 ton payload in a geosynchronous transfer orbit, and
with its Breeze M engine update, it will be able to place an
unrivaled 4 ton payload into a geosynchronous orbit. 66 It
can do so far more economically than its closest
competitors. Its average price per launch is $50 to $70
million. Shuttle launches cost anywhere from $160 to $215
million. The Titan IV costs from $240 to $270 million. The
space industry measurement of costs is best determined by
the price per pound that it takes to place a given payload
in orbit. The Proton only costs $2,000 per pound. In
comparison, the shuttle costs about $12,000 per pound. The
66
[WWW.dot.gov/faa ] . Characteristics of Launch Vehicles. This is a





Titan IV and Ariane V are 50percent more expensive than the
Proton on a per pound basis. 67 With its 5 year reliability
of 96 percent 68 , and the overwhelming cost advantage, the
Proton is without peer in the international launch service
arena and it is shown below in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Proton D being placed into its vertical launch
position at Baikonur operations pad.
An agreement between the RF and US governments allows
only limited use of the Proton for commercial applications
67
[WWW.rocketplane.com ] . The Competition. This is another website that
offers a fairly current comparison of the major launch vehilces.
68Lausen and Voce, page 2
66

through the year 2000, and only if these services are
offered at not less than 7.5 percent below international
market value. Iridium missions are also permitted under
this agreement. 69 Table 1 below compares the relevant


















Proton 46,297 4,850 $50-70 $2,000 96 70
Shuttle 40,000 5,203 $500 $12,500 98.1
Titan IV 39,100 10,200 $240-270 $4,570 87.0
Atlas IIA 16,050 3,307 $65-80 $5,300 100
Delta II 11,109 N/A $58 $5,800 94.8
Ariane V 39,600 N/A $114-143 $4, 924 50.0
Long March
HE
19,400 3,300 $40-50 $3,000 87.8
Table 1. Launch Vehicle Comparisons. 71 Green indicates
first or second place in a given category, red indicates last
place in a given category. Proton has the best overall mix of
positive indicators.
69 Fact Sheet. US-Russian Commercial Space Launch Agreement, The White
ridHouse, Office of the Vice President, September 2 , 1993.
°Laursen and Voce, page 1.
xThis table was compiled primarily from three diffent websites:
[www. rocketplane . com ] , [www. dot . gov ] , and [www.bhm. tis . net ] . Where data





Several conclusions can be quickly reached by examining
Table 1 . The Proton launch vehicle offers the greatest
payload range and it can place more payload weight - more
than 23 tons - into a LEO. Only the shuttle and the Titan
IV can place more weight in a geosynchronous orbit (GEO)
,
but at a price of 3 to 10 times more. The Proton offers a
savings realization of over $400 million dollars over the
shuttle for GEO orbits. With the Breeze M modification to
the Proton's engines, the cost per pound of payload will be
halved to $1,000. 7 2 Overall, the Proton offers the greatest
payload flexibility at the least expensive price, with the
greatest degree of reliability. It is no surprise that the
ISS Freedom will rely on the Proton for all its heavy lift
requirements
.
If the US and the ISS Alpha, as well as commercial
space organizations, are to successfully rely on the
Baikonur Cosmodrome and the Proton launch vehicle, there
must be a clear methodology to determine insightful and
comprehensive measures of effectiveness (MOE) of the RSA
operational, technical, and managerial impact on these
72
[www. Imco. com/ILS ] . International Launch Services is the joint
Lockheed Martin-Krunichev-Energiya (LKE) consortium that markets the




systems. These MOE must be able to readily track and assess
the strengths, weaknesses, overall viability, and to
possibly identify areas of vulnerability, for Baikonur and
the Proton. This is an emerging challenge, to be sure.
The percentage of global launches represented by
Baikonur, and the annual value of billed services are the
clearest indicators of overall managerial and operational
viability for Baikonur. Last year, Baikonur was responsible
for over 42 percent of international commercial launches.
Similarly, the reliability of the Proton and the cost per
unit weight of payload are the most important MOE in
predicting the long-term viability of this launch vehicle.
No other launch vehicle offers the reliability,
affordability, and payload flexibility of the Proton.
Beyond the flexibility afforded by launches from Baikonur,
and the economical reliability inherent in the Proton launch
vehicle are there additional technical and scientific
advantages to working with the Russians?
D. IN SITU BILOGICAL EXPERIENCE AND INSIGHTS
1. Extended Space Presence
Forty years of Soviet emphasis on long duration human
exposure to the space environment has resulted in the
Russian space agency being pre-eminent in in-situ data and
research of the space environment. They possess unrivalled
69
insight on how to best integrate the physical and
psychological demands of space into mission operations. 73
The U.S. has been trying to gain this same insight by also
having its own astronauts experience extended stays onboard
the Space Station Mir.
2 . Microgravity Experience
The Russians also have extensive experience in working
in microgravity environments, which offers extensive
opportunities for ISS scientists and engineers. The ISS
will also seek to benefit from this experience. Its
Gravitational Biology and Ecology Program will examine the
role and effect of gravity on the evolution, development and
function of certain biological processes. 74 Areas where the
Russians may offer the best insight and experience include,
but are not limited to, cellular and molecular biology, and
the gravitational effects on ecological systems. The
Soviets extensive, multi-decade track record with extended
space stays extends beyond the realms of biology and
ecology.
One of the goals of the ISS' microgravity experiments
will be to gain an understanding of how buoyancy-driven
73For the ISS emphasis on life sciences and effects of long term space
exposure, refer to the ISS website




convection and sedimentation affect the processing and
manufacturing of materials. 75 In the microgravity
environment of space, acoustic and electromagnetic forces
have greater influence than other processing techniques.
The end result could very well be improved optical fibers
for telecommunications and optoelectronics, as well as




Russian in-situ expertise with microgravity applies to
other scientific disciplines as well. The fluid physics of
multiphase fluid flow and solid-fluid interface can lead to
breakthroughs in the design of earthquake-proof buildings
and improved performance of power facilities. Microgravity
experiments in combustion efficiency technologies will
ideally lead to reduced combustion pollution and better fire
control and suppression technologies. 77
The Soviet Union's and Russian Federation's 40 year
track record for extended human presence in space offers a
wealth of in-situ data and experience in the areas of
microgravity and space effects on human physiology. Key
75Refer to another page at the ISS website. It pertains to microgravity
sciences at:




scientific endeavors onboard the ISS will be based on, as
well as build on, Russian expertise. Soviet and now Russian
experience in these areas will, and should be, exploited to
minimize the learning curve for future scientific advances
in bio-medical technology, fluid physics, manufacturing
processes and pollution control. The ISS offers an ideal
opportunity to benefit from historical scientific strengths
of the Soviet, and now Russian, space program.
E. CURRENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, et al.
There are several prominent commercial space firms and
space-related industries in the U.S. currently enjoying and
profiting from the distinct technical and scientific
advantages offered by the Russian space industry. Lockheed
Martin Aerospace is among the US leaders working with the
Russians and has formed a cooperative venture through LKE
International (Lockheed-Khrunichev-Energia) . It jointly
markets the Atlas and Proton under the consortium
International Launch Services (ILS) . Boeing is also
attempting to develop prospects involving Ukrainian launch
vehicles and a variety of converted Russian missiles. 78
Motorola launched five of its Iridium satellites aboard a
80ffice of Technology Assessment, 58
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Proton rocket and is leading the international market in
acquiring Russian space services. Launching five satellites
on one launch vehicle saved Motorola over $10 million.
These successes have expanded marketing opportunities for
the RSA in the US.
2 . Engine Technology
Russian launch vehicles and propulsion technology have
been introduced to the US through purchase and co-production
agreements. Aerojet and Pratt & Whitney have each announced
activities designed to replace the engines of existing US
launch vehicles. At the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission
meeting in June 1994, Pratt & Whitney also announced that it
would be working with NASA in exploring the possible
application of tri-propellant-rocket-engine technology
developed by NPO Energomash. 79 The successful alliances
extend beyond the realm of hardware and launch services.
Russian remote sensing data products and services have
been successfully marketed in the US. Firms including EOSAT,
Worldmap International, and Core Technologies have announced
the availability of Russian optical imagery with spatial
resolution as good as two meters, as well as radar data from
the Almaz satellites. There have also been efforts to apply
79 Ibid, 58.
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Russian materials science expertise as well as other
technologies to US aerospace products. Kaiser Aerospace and
Electronics and McDonnell Douglas are among the firms
pursuing these possibilities. The RSA offers extensive in
situ experience, resources and scientific data in fields and
specialties where US experience is limited, if not
nonexistent. McDonnell Douglas has established joint
research centers in Moscow and Huntington Beach, California,
with the Mechanical Engineering Research Institute of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. McDonnell Douglas is also
pursuing technology and software development efforts. 80
Despite the fact that the legal framework and business
culture in Russia are still maturing, there are current
agreements and business ventures in place that have been
successful and profitable for both parties. What is the
nature of these agreements and what elements within them
have been the keys to success? Are there additional
opportunities for expanded space cooperation between US
agencies and firms and the RSA? Are there additional
constraints and impediments to address?
80 Ibid, 58
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F. COOPERATION AND OPPORTUNITY
1. NASA Steps In
Cooperation between the US and Russia is not limited to
governmental agreements. It includes inter-agency
agreements between the RSA and NASA as well as private
commercial ventures. The US government has clearly taken
the lead. In 1993 the US administration of President
Clinton initiated the merging of the US and Russian Space
station programs with the management structure of the ISS.
The political, commercial, and scientific ramifications of
this merger will be felt for years, because the agreement
will last at least until the year 2014. 81 Under this
agreement the US will pay Russia $400 million for specific
functions. NASA will directly pay the RSA. In fact, NASA
Administrator David Goldin intimated that NASA would likely
pay the RSA up to $100 million (above the earlier $400
million) a year for a total of ten years. 82 The financial
incentive of this cooperation has its own purpose.
The $400+ million is related to the Administration's
desire to use the national space policy as a supplement to
oxCommittee on Science, Space, and Technology, 125.
82 Ibid.
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foreign policy regarding ballistic missile technology-
proliferation. This commitment should help preserve
employment for Russian engineers and technicians in at least
some of Russia's major space industrial centers. 83 The US
insists that Russia end its plans to export its rocket
engine technology to the Indian Space Research Organization.
The initiative (and the $400+ million) worked; Russia has
agreed to sell only rocket engines to India but not the
underlying technology. 84 Russia and the US have also agreed
to cooperate in space-based environmental observations and
other aspects of space science. The Clinton
Administration's National Space Transportation Policy
directs the US government to negotiate and implement
agreements controlling trade in commercial space launch
services. 85
G. CONCLUSION
1 . Russian Strengths of the Baikonur Cosmodrome and
the Proton
Within the accepted understanding of typical space
mission architectures, Russia's capabilities in the launch
83 Space Policy, Volume 11, Number 3, August, 1995, page 210.
84 Ibid, page 126.
85The White House. Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Fact Sheet-
National Space Transportation Policy," 5 August 1994, 11.
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segment are unparalleled. The extensive capabilities of the
Baikonur Cosmodrome support a variety of launch vehicles in
a variety of launch missions. Its 1000-launch history and
ability to support as many as 40 launches per year make it,
justifiably, the clear leader in providing international
launch services. With nine launching pads and 14 launching
tables, two airfields, its own dedicated railroad system, as
well as the world's largest oxy-nitrogren plant, it offers
more versatility at one location than any other launch
facility in the world.
The primary workhorse of the Russian space segment is
the Proton launch vehicle. With over 200 launches to its
credit, its five year reliability rating of 96 percent is
only surpassed by the U.S. space shuttle. No other platform
offers the range of payload capabilities, from 46,000 pounds
at a low earth orbit to 4,800 pounds at geosynchronous
orbit, at the lowest price of $2,000 per pound. The Breeze
M engine upgrade to the Proton will lower the payload cost
to an astonishing $1,000 per pound. The reliability,
versatility, and cost of the Proton launch vehicle make it
the preferred launch service provider on the commercial
market.
Motorola placed almost one third of its 66-satellite
constellation Iridium into LEO from the Proton, launched
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from the Baikonur Cosmodrome- Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, and
Lockheed Martin are also increasing the scope of their
relationship with Russian space industries. American
commercial aerospace and communication companies are clearly
profiting from a commercial relationship with Russian space
industry. The launch segment capabilities that these
commercial companies enjoy will also well serve the
International Space Station.
The ISS will also benefit from the extensive Soviet and
Russian in situ experience in space duration and
microgravity science. The Russians are sharing the
biological and physiological experience gained from a long
history of extended space duration on the human body. Their
microgravity expertise will be a key enabler to developing
innovations in the fields of fluid physics, pollution and
combustion control, and processing and manufacturing.
2 . Unlimited Potential
The potential to learn from and build on Russian space
expertise is unlimited. The opportunity offered by the
joint relationship of the International Space Station
provides many positive possibilities for all participants,
if the relationship, with all its risks and payoffs, are
clearly understood. Understanding the exact nature and role
of the Russian Space Agency in the ISS is necessary to
78
protect the technological and commercial interests of the
United States space industry.
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V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
PROLIFERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
A. BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION AND THE
RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY
1 . Russia and the Missile Technology Control Regime
The Soviet Union possessed a formidable ballistic
missile capability to the very end of its existence. The
questions and concerns about the consequences of the break
up of the Soviet Union and its ballistic missile program
were legitimate and troubling. With no centralized control
of the space program and its supporting ballistic missile
technology, what would happen to the personnel and
scientific expertise embodied in the old Soviet space
agencies and industries? The prospect of technical flight
of these personnel and these technologies to other countries
is as troubling a concern for national strategists today as
is was seven years ago when the Soviet Union dissolved. In
point of fact, the troubling fears of technical flight have
been realized with a reduction in the Russian space-related
workforce of 30-35 percent; some 200,000 personnel have left
the space industry for jobs inside and outside the
country. 86
860ffice of Technology Assessment, 20,
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Linking ballistic missile technology proliferation to
financial support of the RSA and a partnership within the
ISS is a challenging yet compelling proposition. Russia and
the RSA should be given wide latitude, and fully supported,
in their efforts to make meaningful contributions to the
International Space Station. Partnership within the ISS may
be the best, if not the only, avenue through which the US
can consistently monitor the Russian commitment to, and
progress in, ballistic missile technology proliferation
control. From a larger perspective, Russia's ability to
police itself, while also being policed, must be understood
within the context of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) as well as its full fledged participation within the
International Space Station.
The MTCR was originally established in 1987 with the
aim of controlling exports of missiles capable of carrying
nuclear weapons, as well as the required technology to do
so. In 1993 controls were extended to include missiles
capable of carrying biological and chemical weapons. The
MTCR has 29 members. During the recent plenary meeting held
in Tokyo, MTCR members reaffirmed that the MTCR continued to
be an essential mechanism to prevent proliferation of
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
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destruction. 87 In point of fact, it is a multilateral
regime devoted to such a goal. The MTCR complements various
global non-proliferation instruments including the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 88 The US
updated its commitment to the MTCR on the 7 th of January,
1993. In doing so, the US re-affirmed that it is
accountable to the international community for open
disclosure of ballistic missile technology proliferation. 89
The MTCR represents a strictly voluntary and relatively
informal agreement among several countries which share
common proliferation concerns. The MTCR' s main goal is to
limit and control, if not eliminate, the proliferation of
unmanned ballistic missile delivery systems for weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). 90 It truly is an egalitarian
arrangement: all partners have equal standing within the
87Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Meeting, Press Release.
Tokyo, November 6th , 1997.
88 Ibid.
89U.S. Government. State Department. U.S. State Department Guidelines
on the MTCR. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office January 1993,
3.
90
[ http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/missiles/1997 plenary info. html ] ,
The Missile Technology Control Regime: An Information Paper. This
information paper was released by MTCR Member States following their
1997 Plenary Meeting in Tokyo. The http address is an American
Federation of Scientists website. The page referenced here is a Q&A
format that addresses, in lay vernacular, the most salient aspects of
the MTCR.
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regime and all MTCR decisions represent the consensus of
signatories. The members of the MTCR also routinely provide
pertinent export licensing issues to other members. It is
essential to emphasize that the MTCR is the only multi-
lateral arrangement that specifically addresses ballistic
and cruise missile technology. 91 Russian participation in,
and adherence to, the covenants of the MTCR are vital, given
RF ballistic missile capabilities.
The MTCR dictates that greatest proliferation
constraint be placed on complete rocket systems, to include
ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles; this is the
heart of Russian space capabilities. Also included on the
MTCR control list are rocket engines, guidance systems, and
warhead mechanisms. Production facilities are also included
on this list. 92
Russia's space and ballistic missile capabilities
warrant the attention of the MTCR. This realization, and
the desire to ensure another layer of proliferation
compliance for the Russians, animated the agreement to
reorganize the International Space Station Freedom to






The ISS as Proliferation Control Leverage
In the Fall of 1993 the U.S. government negotiated the
re-organization of the International Space Station. Gone
was the sole reliance on Western technology and
infrastructure support. In its place was a re-worked Space
Station, nominally referred to as "Alpha". ISS Alpha
represents a systematic attempt to integrate the strengths
of the Russian space program into the management and
technology infrastructure of the pre-existing station.
Within the new concept of the Space Station, the dual themes
of national security policy and space policy were addressed.
The reorganization was deliberately built upon the
understanding that Russia will fully comply with the
international standards concerning ballistic missile
proliferation. 93 The motives are clear: the U.S. can best
ensure the stabilization of the former Soviet aerospace
industry by engaging it within the architecture of the
International Space Station.
3 . A Worthy and Strategic Goal
Cooperation with the Russians on the Space Station
gives them, their space industries, and the Russian Space
Agency a worthwhile goal upon which to focus their energies
93John Pike, Ralphs, Russian American Space Cooperation, 10 December
1993, at [http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/jp 931210.htm ] , 2.
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and talents. Their technical abilities will be harnessed to
a sustained scientific endeavor and they will be able to
both learn from and contribute to this undertaking. Given
the exchange rate of the post-reform ruble, the U.S.
commitment to Russian participation in the Space Station
resembles a Marshall Plan of the cosmos. 94 A broad-based
program of cooperation and engagement in the Space Station
will act as a long term stabilizer to the Russian space
industry. The most important aspect of the administration's
efforts was to keep Russian scientists and engineers
committed to positive endeavors and to prevent the possible
transfer of personnel and missile technology to other
countries. 95 Continued funding support for RSA will be
directly tied to performance and management standards, and
most significantly, technology proliferation compliance.
The new Space Station agreement confronts the reality
of Russian ballistic missile technology proliferation:
compliance with the MTCR is not as compelling as significant
and sustained financial support. This is not a function as
much of cynicism, as it is of realpolitik. Allowing and
encouraging Russian participation in the re-organized
International Space Station Alpha is the best insurance of
94 ibid, 5.
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controlling the ballistic missile technology of Russia and
the RSA. It is important to recognize that this
relationship is not strictly one-sided: the RF and RSA can
offer significant technologic capabilities to the
International Space Station.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION AND THE RUSSIAN SPACE
AGENCY
1 . Revising the Space Station Design
The integration of the RSA and Russian space industries
into the revised International Space Station Alpha was
developed in detail as a result of the September 1993
U.S. /Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological
Cooperation, chaired by Vice-President Gore and RF Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Russian participation was
segmented into three distinct phases. The goal was to
gradually incorporate the most conspicuous strengths of the
space program of the former Soviet Union into the revised
International Space Station.
Phase One established an exploratory association of the
space programs of the United States and Russia. There were
three distinct goals to Phase One. The first goal entailed
a practical understanding of each country's design,
9$Russian Involvement,
[http://station.nasa. gov/ reference/ status/ russianl .html ] , 1
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development, training, and operational cultures. As the
early anecdotes of the Soviet Space Program suggest,
scientists in the U.S. and Russia might well approach the
same engineering challenge in significantly different ways.
The second goal of Phase One was to create and build an ever
expanding corps of American astronauts and support personnel
familiar with long-duration space flight. This is another
specialty in which the Russians clearly excel. The third
goal of Phase One was to reduce risk to the International
Space Station Alpha by the demonstration of proven
technology and testing concepts. In this regard, the long
track record of the Proton launch vehicle and the sustained
history of launch operations at the Baikonur Cosmodrome
became design considerations which were integrated into the
full scope of ISS operations. Phase One of the new ISS
agreements was carefully built around, and tailored to, the
strengths of the RSA. NASA and the RSA initiated a subset
of goals to facilitate Phase One.
The NASA/RSA Protocol 96 aims to establish and nurture
joint operational skills which are deemed to be critical
transitional skills for both cosmonauts and astronauts. Two
cosmonauts will fly on the shuttle and there will be a total
^^Russian Involvement,
[http : //station . nasa . gov/reference/status/russian3 . html ] , 1
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U.S. presence on the Mir of at least two years. There will
as many as ten Shuttle and Mir docking missions which will
serve as valuable experience for future Shuttle/Space
Station dockings. There will also be a joint science
mission and joint development of supporting technologies.
The successful achievement of Phase One goals will ensure
the smooth transition to the second and third phases.
2. Russian Contributions to the ISS
The second and third phases of Russian support to the
ISS involve the actual construction and orbiting of ISS
elements, like the FGB shown below in Figure 6. The
Russians are responsible for designing and launching two of
the first three elements of the ISS.
.




Figure 6. The Boeing-contracted, Khrunichev Productions
Space Center-built, Functional Cargo Block (FGB) . The FGB




The successful launching of these two elements will
determine whether the ISS will be a viable space station,
and whether the RSA and the Russian space industry prove to
be worthy and legitimate partners. It is necessary to
examine the scope and commitment of the RSA to the ISS, as
embodied in the FGB and Service Module.
Figure 7. This is an artist's conception of the U.S. -built
Node 1 adapter being deployed by the Space Shuttle. It is
in its docking position with the previously-orbited FGB.
The FGB will be the first element of the ISS to be
launched (see Figure 7). As the first element of the ISS,
it will provide the initial propulsion and power to the
space station. As construction and assembly of the space
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station progress, the FGB will provide orbital control and
communications power for the U.S. -built Node 1
.
97 In the
later stages of the ISS, the FGB will provide supplemental
propulsion storage in its external storage tanks. This 20
ton, 41 foot-wide spacecraft will remain in orbit while it
awaits to be mated with the Node 1 element as shown in
Figure 8
.
Figure 8. Another perspective of the Node 1 and the FGB,
once the two elements have been coupled.
In an effort to increase the versatility and capability
of the original Russian design, the Boeing Company was
selected by NASA to act as the prime contractor. Boeing
97 Functional Cargo Block, [http://207.8 6.88.39/station/elements/fgb ] , 1
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emphasized versatility and upgraded electronics. As a
result, the FGB now has a more robust attitude control
function, increased orbital refueling flexibility with a
docking port at its nadir, and upgraded avionics. 98 The
FGB's refueling nadir (earth-pointing) port will allow the
FGB to be refueled from the Russian logistics re-supply
spacecraft Progress. This will lessen the fuel criticality
of the Service Module (SM) and will result in a more
versatile platform. Because the SM is the first element of
the ISS to be launched, and because its functions of
attitude control, power, and communications support for the
Node 1 are absolutely critical, the success of the Russian-
built FGB will determine the initial success of the ISS
Alpha. The key to the long term success of the space
station will be the successful design and orbiting of the
Service Module.
The Service Module is truly the first ail-Russian
segment" designed and built exclusively for the ISS; there
is no prime contractor in the US. The Service Module will
serve as the initial living quarters for ISS personnel. The
^^Modifications to the FGB Block,
[http://207.86.88.39/station/elements/fgb/mods.html ] , 1






SM will provide the necessary life support systems, power
and communications systems, as well as have a capability for
ground-controlled remote command capabilities. The Service
Module is massive at 21 tons and it will also be launched
into space from Baikonur aboard a Proton. Figure 9 below
shows a cutaway perspective of the Service Module.
The Service Module is derived from and similar in design
to the Mir Space Station Core Module illustrated below.
Figure 9. Cutaway view of the Service Module and its living
quarters
.
In a typical (Soviet and now) Russian engineering
decision, the Service Module is mostly based on very proven
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design technology. Although this may not sound like an
endorsement, the Service Module design is derived largely
from the Mir Space Station Core Module. Figure 10 below
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Figure 10. Another perspective of the Service Module. Note
its relationship to the FGB. The Node 1 adapter joins the
FGB and Service Module. The Progress M is the Russian
logistics refueling and servicing spacecraft.
The Service Module's solar arrays span almost 100 feet and
it is over 40 feet long. The SM is designed to have four
docking ports, with the aft docking port consisting of a
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probe and cone mechanism for the Progress and Soyuz re-
supply spacecraft. The Service Module is a rather spacious
(by current space standards) craft.
The living quarters include sleeping areas, a
refrigerator and freezer, toilet and dinner table. In the
Service Module there are 14 windows, with one window in each
crew area. There will also be a NASA-supplied exercise
cycle and treadmill. In the final configuration of the
International Space Station, the Russian supplied segments
of the FGB and Service Module represent over one third of
the orbiting mass. These two components, when joined
together by the Node 1 coupler, will form the core around
which the rest of the space station is assembled. It is not
melodramatic to conclude that without these components,
there will be no International Space Station as currently
envisioned. For better or for worse, the fate of the
International Space Station is tied to that of the Russian
space industry and the RSA.
C . CONCLUSION
1 . The Role of the MTCR and the ISS
The United States has prudently sought to stabilize the
RSA and Russian space industry through two high profile
agreements. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
welcomed Russian participation in their efforts to control
95

the proliferation of technologies which might facilitate the
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) . Russian launch
vehicle prowess, if not its relative cheapness and
effectiveness, could be a prominent contributor to the
spread and lethality of WMD. MTCR provides the moral
imperative for Russian participation. Merging Russian
technologies in the ISS ensures financial and technical
commitment for the RSA and Russian space industries. Figure
11 below shows the final ISS configuration.
Figure 11. Artist's conception of the final configuration
of the International Space Station. The Russian FGB-Service
Module link are somewhat hidden. The link is amidship,
perpendicular to the solar array station and the
US/ESA/Japanese complex in the foreground of the picture.
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The ISS represents a successful link between national
security and space policies. It is not merely a giveaway to
the Russians, nor should it be viewed as such: the Russians
can and will render significant and highly credible
contributions to the ISS. The Russian ability to launch
massive payloads into a LEO orbit with the Proton launch
vehicle will dramatically limit operating costs for the
space station. Perhaps more importantly, Russian commitment
to the ISS will provide a sustained outlet for Russian
scientific and technical expertise. The Service Module and
Functional Cargo Block (FGB) represent over one third of the
total mass of the space station and are the architectural
hub upon which the rest of the space station will be
assembled. Russia and the RSA will critically support the
International Space Station. The ISS is as necessary for




A. OPTIMISM AND JOINT COOPERATION
The United States is now working closely with the
Russian Federation in areas and endeavors that span the
continuum of strategic policy. The area of joint space
cooperation, whether commercial or governmental, bears
continuous scrutiny. This paper examined the RSA space
program and assessed it, making note of possible advantages
in working with the RSA, as well as noting possible hazards.
Certainly, assessing and tracking the overall percentage of
successful launches from Baikonur, as well as Baikonur's
share of all global launches, offer the clearest insight
into the RSA' s global launch support posture and viability.
The total annual value of billed services RSA charges its
customers for use of Baikonur, and the rate at which this
value changes, also will give clear insight into the overall
health and trends of launch services conducted by the RSA.
B. THE PROTON
The Proton has the heaviest payload capacity currently
being offered on the commercial market. Because of its
extended track record of success and reliability, it has
quickly established itself as a major player in the
international launch vehicle market.
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C. LACK OF VIABLE ALTERNATIVES
The most obvious alternative to an ISS partnership with
the Russians is no partnership whatsoever. Assuming RSA
responsibilities would lessen ISS cost overruns and schedule
slippage. But the costs entailed in redesigning the ISS
without the benefit of the Proton and the launch facilities
at Baikonur would quickly overtake any cost overruns
currently attributed to the RF. The ISS would have to be
significantly redesigned and the delays resulting from this
redesign would easily be measured in years and not months.
The ISS would also have to forego unique Russian insight
into the effects of microgravity and long duration space
activity.
Removing the ISS as technology proliferation leverage
over the Russians and the RSA would force the international
community to rely entirely on the MTCR accords and the good
faith of a diminished RSA to police Russian space and
missile technology proliferation. Yeltsin has empowered the
RSA to control all aspects of its space and missile
technology. The ISS will also offer Russian space and
missile personnel a meaningful alternative to proliferation.
Partnership with the RSA in the ISS is the only effective
way to engage and monitor the Russians' proliferation
control efforts.
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D. WHY COMMITMENT TO RUSSIA AND THE RSA MATTERS
The opportunities offered by a partnership with the
Russians and the RSA in the International Space Station are
unique and of the utmost importance to the US. Russian
heavy lift capability as represented by the Proton and the
launch flexibility potential of the Baikonur Cosmodrome are
irreplaceable; without Russian participation in the ISS the
entire scope and design goals of the space station would
have to be thoroughly redesigned.
Partnership with the Russians in the ISS also offers
distinct scientific and technical advantages to the ISS as
well as the US commercial space industry. The Russians have
unique experience in the effects of long duration space
exposure on the human body. Russian expertise in material
science applications in space as well as microgravity
experiences are vital to the success of the experiments
planned for the ISS.
From a strategic perspective, a partnership with the
RSA in the ISS may be the most effective, practical means
whereby Russia's success at controlling the proliferation of
its space and missile technology can be monitored with any
degree of certainty. The RSA now has the sole responsibility
to control Russian technology proliferation. The US must
take advantage of the ISS partnership to constructively
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engage the RSA in its proliferation control efforts. The
ISS partnership is an open door to witness RF proliferation
control efforts at very close range. Closing this window of
opportunity would leave the MTCR as the sole means by which
to induce Russian compliance with proliferation control.
The US must not limit its range of options and degrees of
freedom; every avenue through which to monitor and aid
Russian proliferation control must be pursued.
The US should remain committed to working with the RSA
both on a multilateral level, and within the management
structure of the International Space Station Alpha. While
being mindful of the constraints and hazards of the RF
political, legal, and technological environment, the US
should actively pursue and incorporate the RSA' s distinct
operational and technical advantages into its own space
program. The 21 st century is just around the corner, and
how the US balances its space commitments with the
advantages and hazards of working with the RSA may
significantly influence the extent and nature of our future
space accomplishments. Space offers unlimited opportunities
for the US and the RF. How these opportunities are managed
and pursued will truly determine each country' s space legacy
for the next millenium.
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